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The main argument in this book is that theistic natural signs lie at the core of the 
cosmological, teleological, and moral arguments for God’s existence, and that these signs 
make possible properly basic, non-inferential knowledge of God. Or, as C. Stephen Evans (a 
philosopher at Baylor University) puts it a bit more weakly, they provide prima facie, 
defeasible, non-inferential justification for belief in God which in some cases is sufficient 
for knowledge. This original and interesting book essentially consists in an explication, 
unpacking, and defense of this main idea. Evans attempts to use the concept of a theistic 
natural sign to explain how we can have non-inferential knowledge of God’s reality, why 
theistic arguments are so pervasive and forceful (for those who find them so), and, finally, 
why such arguments can so readily be resisted. 
 
In the second chapter of the book Evans unpacks the concept of a theistic natural sign. 
Theistic natural signs are similar but not identical to Reidian natural signs, the latter being 
the means by which, according to Thomas Reid, we perceive the external world. Reidian 
natural signs can either be mental, such as the sensation of solidity one gets from touching a 
hard object, or physical, such as the perception of body posture. Here one perceives, say, 
that someone is sad by means of a perception of his or her bodily posture. Either way, and 
details aside, the key idea here is that Reidian natural signs make possible non-inferential 
knowledge (perception is a paradigm case here). Similarly, there are theistic natural signs 
that make possible non-inferential knowledge of God’s reality. Evans is careful to point out 
that the justification here can be sufficient for knowledge but is also prima facie and 
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defeasible. The signs Evans has in mind are cosmic wonder (chapter three), beneficial order 
(chapter four), and the experience of moral accountability and the intrinsic worth of human 
beings (chapter five). These theistic natural signs point to the reality of God’s existence in 
the same way that Reidian natural signs point to the objects of perception. According to 
Evans, humans have an “in-built propensity” to believe in God when they encounter the 
aforementioned signs (37). Evans is careful to point out that theistic natural signs function 
mainly to make us aware of God, not to provide us with a rich storehouse of theological 
propositions about God; thus, theistic natural signs “underdetermine any beliefs about God 
we may form as a result” of using them (185) and may well lead to multifarious and even 
false beliefs about God (33-36). 
 
In the first two chapters (and then at various points throughout the book) Evans argues that 
theistic natural signs satisfy two important epistemological principles regarding the 
knowledge of God (the principles themselves are explicated in chapter one), which he calls 
“Pascalian constraints” (17). First, there is the Wide Accessibility Principle (WAP), 
according to which, if God exists, we should expect the knowledge of him to be widely 
available. Evans’s second is the Easy Resistibility Principle (ERP), according to which the 
knowledge of God is to be expected to be resistible by rational people – i.e. God does not 
make his reality so evident that it would be rationally impossible to disbelieve in him. While 
defending ERP later in the book (chapter six) Evans concedes that the knowledge of God is 
so resistible that there may well be cases of inculpable unbelief – i.e. cases of unbelief in 
which the seeker is motivated to believe in God but is unable to do so through no fault of 
her own. The rationale for the ERP is that God would value freely given love and devotion 
from us and that undeniable evidence of God would force many of us to begrudgingly jump 
on the theistic bandwagon when we would otherwise prefer not to. Such begrudging 
allegiance is not really what God is after. 
 
Theistic natural signs, then, provide us with widely accessible but easily resistible prima 
facie, non-inferential justification (sufficient for knowledge in some cases) for a belief in 
God’s reality by making believers aware of that reality. This, however, is not the only role 
they play in the knowledge of God. It is possible to reflection the signs themselves and use 
them to develop an argument for the reality to which they point, and this is exactly what 
Evans claims is going on with natural theology. More specifically, at the core of the 
cosmological, teleological, and moral arguments for God’s existence lies the natural signs 
of cosmic wonder, beneficial order, our experience of moral accountability, and our 
experience of the intrinsic worth of human beings, respectively. The signs serve as the 
ground or foundation of the arguments. As Evans puts it, “The arguments themselves are 
best understood as attempts to articulate those signs and make their evidential force more 
apparent” (24). Evans is careful to point out that the power of the signs is not limited to their 
value for making theistic arguments and that the signs may still provide evidence for God 
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even if they function poorly when used to formulate premises for a theistic argument. 
Additionally, for Evans, any power that theistic arguments do have is derived from the signs 
that lie at their foundation. 
 
In chapters three through five Evans discusses the cosmological, teleological, and moral 
arguments for God’s existence and the signs that lie at their foundation and give them their 
power, a power not exhausted by their role in fashioning premises: cosmic wonder 
(cosmological argument), beneficial order (teleological argument), and moral accountability 
and intrinsic human worth (moral argument). In these chapters Evans does a nice job of 
taxonomizing the various types of the arguments in question and providing brief accounts of 
their strengths and weaknesses. He is very open about the resistibility of their premises and 
concedes that rational people can and do reject the arguments. On the other hand, he 
frequently provides or suggests theistic rebuttals to the objections (he is by no means, nor 
attempts to be, exhaustive), and his considered position seems to be that the arguments 
themselves rest on plausible assumptions that are widely accepted. The uncertainty to which 
they are prey to is to be expected given the ERP; moreover, no philosophical argument of 
substance succeeds with certainty, so these arguments are really no worse off than most 
other substantive philosophical arguments (170). 
 
Partisans of the arguments, and their objectors, may well quibble with Evans’s taxonomies 
and his appraisals of the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments. Such quibbles, 
moreover, may be correct, but they would miss the point Evans is trying to make. Evans is 
not trying to defend or defeat the arguments themselves. Though he does seem favorably 
disposed to the arguments, Evans willingly concedes their shortcomings. In addition to 
being intellectually honest, he seems willing to do this for at least two reasons. The first is 
that, for him, the power of the signs which lie at the foundations of the arguments is not 
exhausted (his term) by their role in the arguments. People can and do move from the signs 
to an awareness and conception of God in non-inferential but justified fashion. Evans 
attempts to showcase the force of the signs by concluding chapters three through five with 
discussions of those who are skeptical of the arguments but who recognize the power of the 
signs. Second, given ERP, resistibility is to be expected. 
 
Evans considers a variety of objections to his project; two are worth mentioning. One is that 
scientific explanations of religious belief undermine its validity. Evans turns this objection 
on its head, finding instead support for the wide accessibility of the knowledge of God in 
scientific accounts of religious belief which argue that belief in God/gods is hard-wired in 
human beings. In connection with this argument Evans does a good job deposing objections 
to religious belief that putatively follow from evolutionary explanations of religion. He 
notes that, if evolutionary explanations for a cognitive faculty automatically render it 
unreliable, then all of our cognitive faculties are doomed, not just the one(s) responsible for 
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religious belief. Evans, incidentally, does not say whether there is a special faculty that 
produces religious belief or, if there is no such faculty, which of our more ordinary faculties 
are responsible for such belief. In any case, Evans views scientific explanations of religious 
belief as providing us with an account of the natural process instituted by God to bring 
about belief in himself (38-42; 155-157). 
 
It is possible to criticize Evans here on the grounds that he does nothing to show that any 
such natural process, including his own account, is veridical – showing logical consistency 
is not the same as providing positive evidence, after all. Aware of this, Evans attempts to 
shield himself from the criticism in two ways. First, he says that he is not assuming that 
God exists but is merely “asking what would follow from God’s existence” (13). Second, he 
argues that we have no option but to trust the outputs of our cognitive faculties unless we 
have a reason not to and that this policy should be extended to the beliefs we form in the 
basic, non-inferential way on the basis of theistic natural signs (174-184). Evans is willing 
to concede that, while the theistic natural signs do provide some support for belief in God, 
support enough for knowledge in some cases, folks who have defeater worries will need 
“additional considerations” (187). The implication seems to be that the prima facie 
justification provided by theistic natural signs can be so slight and partial and subject to 
potential defeat for some folks that they will need additional evidence as well as defeater-
defeaters in order to be, at the end of the day, justified in their theistic belief. On the other 
hand, however: “People who find the theistic natural signs to be powerful and are aware of 
no defeaters for belief in God are reasonable to believe in God just on their basis” (186-
187). 
 
A complaint could here be lodged, however, on the grounds that Evans provides no 
empirical evidence for his contention that people do in fact usually form theistic beliefs in 
response to the theistic natural signs he discusses in this book. On the other hand, Evans 
does concede that the theistic natural signs of cosmic wonder, beneficial order, moral 
accountability, and intrinsic human worth are not the only available grounds for belief in 
God (156), thus preserving the possibility that WAP is correct even if his favored theistic 
natural signs are not the main organ for theistic belief. 
 
The other objection worthy of mention is the problem of divine hiddenness, which occupies 
most of chapter six. Initially the problem takes the form of an objection to WAP: knowledge 
of God should be more widespread than it is. Evans responds to this by arguing that WAP 
cannot be strengthened too much or else ERP is compromised: “Whatever God might do to 
make the knowledge of God truly universal would make such knowledge impossible to 
resist” (158). The problem then morphs into J. L. Schellenberg’s complaint (lodged here in 
Evans’s terms): it seems that the knowledge of God is too resistible, that there are cases of 
inculpable unbelief which a loving God would, if he were real, not allow.  It is fine that the 
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knowledge of God is not universal, but the least God could do is make himself evident 
enough such that the only ones who disbelieve are those who are motivated to do so. 
Evans’s initial response is skepticism that there really are cases of inculpable unbelief: 
perhaps we are self-deceived about our motivations. Evans quickly drops this line of 
reasoning, however, and concedes the possibility of inculpable unbelief. The reason 
inculpable unbelief is not a defeater for theism is that we are not in a position to say that 
God does not have good reasons for allowing it. Evans sees the problem of divine 
hiddenness as a particular application of the problem of evil, arguing that if we have reason 
to trust God in the face of the problem of evil in a general sense, then the same goes for the 
problem of divine hiddenness (164-166). This is essentially a skeptical theist defense 
offered in response to a particular evil and thus inherits the merits and/or demerits of 
skeptical theism. 
 
The book, overall, is quite good and does provide its readers with a plausible account of 
how the knowledge of God might go, an account that explains the data of widespread belief, 
the pervasiveness and force of natural theology, and the persistency of unbelief and 
resistance to theistic arguments. An element of weakness deserving of mention here, 
however, is Evans’s argument in favor of ERP, to wit, that God wants us to freely and 
joyfully love and serve him and that such a response is undermined by more certain 
evidence of his existence (15-16). Here’s the problem: what God would want is freely 
offered friendship. The word “freely” here denotes an indeterminstic choice motivated in 
the right way – i.e. a genuine choice, correctly made, for the right reasons. It is unimportant 
that the doxastic element here, belief in God, be secured in a voluntaristic fashion. There 
seems to be no value in deciding what to believe in the way that we decide what to do on a 
Friday night, and in any case we are not doxastic voluntarists and cannot just freely choose 
what to believe. The only way, then, that more certain evidence of God’s reality could 
compromise the goal of freely chosen friendship with God is if stronger evidence either (1) 
made us more likely to choose antagonism over friendship or (2) somehow lessened our 
freedom of choice, rendering us more automaton-like in our decision in favor of God. Both 
of these options lessen the likelihood of freely chosen friendship and would be grounds for 
God holding back on the quality of the evidence for God. 
 
The rub, however, is that the second option seems to be a non-starter and the first, while at 
least worthy of consideration, finds no mention in the book. Thus, Evans really provides no 
grounds to dismiss the possibility that God could provide much stronger evidence of 
himself without compromising his goal of freely chosen love and service, or friendship. 
Maybe, however, there is some outweighing good that is obtained by God giving us just the 
amount of evidence he has; or perhaps there is some evil more worse than the present-day 
level of unfriendliness with God that is prevented by God giving us just the amount of 
evidence he has. We can only speculate here, and Evans does do some of that, suggesting 
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that perhaps some relationships with God are better off if they are produced through a long, 
difficult process (164). Evans also makes the plausible claim that, if we find that God is 
trustworthy in certain cases, then we may very well have grounds for trusting him in 
situations where we have little to no idea what he is up to, meaning we can trust God in the 
epistemic situation in which we in fact find ourselves in even when we lack an 
understanding as to why it isn’t better (165). It isn’t, then, that nothing whatsoever can be 
said at all, but simply that more needs to be said in support of ERP or some version of it. As 
it stands it needs another supporting beam, something more to buttress it against the strong 
winds in the air.  
